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A heavy cruiser was a type of cruiser, a naval warship designed for long range and high speed, armed generally with naval guns of roughly 203 mm (8 inches) in calibre, whose design parameters were dictated by the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930. Heavy cruisers were generally larger, more heavily armed and more heavily armoured than light cruisers while being smaller, faster, and more lightly armed and armoured than battlecruisers and battleships. Heavy cruisers were not considered , unlike battlecruisers, battleships, and . Heavy cruisers were assigned a variety of roles ranging from commerce raiding to serving as 'cruiser-killers,' i.e. hunting and destroying similarly sized ships.
The heavy cruiser is part of a lineage of ship design from 1915 through the early 1950s, although the term "heavy cruiser" only came into formal use in 1930. The heavy cruiser's immediate precursors were the light cruiser designs of the 1900s and 1910s, rather than the Armoured cruiser of the years before 1905. When the armoured cruiser was supplanted by the battlecruiser, an intermediate ship type between the battlecruiser and the light cruiser was found to be needed—one larger and more powerful than the light cruisers of a potential enemy but not as large and expensive as the battlecruiser so as to be built in sufficient numbers to protect merchant ships and serve in a number of combat theatres.
With their intended targets being other cruisers and smaller vessels, the role of the heavy cruiser differed fundamentally from that of the armoured cruiser. Also, the heavy cruiser was designed to take advantage of advances in naval technology and design. Typically powered by oil-fired rather than the reciprocating steam engines of the armored cruiser, heavy cruisers were capable of far faster speeds and could cruise at high speed for much longer than could an armoured cruiser. They used uniform main guns, mounted in center-line Superfire turrets rather than casemates. Casemate guns and a mixed battery were eliminated to make room for above deck torpedoes, and ever-increasing and more effective anti-aircraft armaments. They also benefited from the superior fire control of the 1920s and continually upgraded through the 1950s. Late in the development cycle radar and electronic countermeasures would also appear and rapidly gain in importance.
Tactics and technology were gearing towards naval encounters held over increasingly longer ranges, which demanded an armament of primarily large calibre guns. The demand for speed with which to outflank a potential enemy and fulfil its traditional role as scout for the fleet demanded a speed preferably 30 percent faster than battleships. Thirty percent was the ratio by which frigates had been faster than ships of the line in the days of sail. If a battleship sailed at 20 knots, this would mean that an armoured cruiser would have to steam at least 26 or 27 knots.
Armoured cruisers could not fulfil these criteria without being built much larger and taking on a different form than they had in the past. The result was the battlecruiser. HMS Invincible and her two sister ships were designed specifically to fulfil these requirements. In a sense they were an extension of the armoured cruiser as a fast, heavily armed scout, commerce protector and cruiser-destroyer, reflected in the term originally ascribed to them, "large armoured cruiser". However, they were much larger, faster and better-armed than armoured cruisers, able to outpace them, stay out of range of their weapons and destroy them with relative impunity. Because they carried the heavy guns normally ascribed to battleships, they could also theoretically hold their place in a battle line more readily than armoured cruisers and serve as the "battleship-cruiser" for which William Hovgaard had argued after Tsushima. All these factors made battlecruisers attractive fighting units, although Britain, Germany and Japan would be the only powers to build them. They also meant that the armoured cruiser as it had been known was now outmoded. No more were built after 1910 and by the end of World War I, the majority of them had been taken out of active service.Breyer, pp. 48–9
Although Lord Fisher, the man behind the building of Invincible, had hoped to replace practically all forms of cruisers with battlecruisers, they proved to be too costly to build in large numbers. At the same time, the third class cruiser (of about 3,000 tons) started to carry thin steel armour on the outside of its hull and became known as a light cruiser. This new type was then joined by 5,000-ton light cruisers, analogous to the older second-class cruisers. The wide gap between the massive battlecruiser of perhaps 20,000 tons and 305 mm (12-inch) guns and the small light cruiser of up to 5,000 tons and 100 mm (4-in) or 155 mm (6-inch) guns naturally left room for an intermediate type. The first such design was the British 'Atlantic cruiser' proposal of 1912, which proposed a long-range cruiser of about 8,000 tons displacement with 190 mm (7.5-inch) guns. This was a response to a rumour that Germany was building cruisers to attack merchant shipping in the Atlantic with 170mm guns. The German raiders proved to be fictional and the 'Atlantic cruisers' were never built. However, in 1915 the requirement for long-range trade-protection cruisers resurfaced and resulted in the . Essentially enlarged light cruisers, being referred to in contemporary reference works as an "improved Birmingham" type after the 6-inch gunned 5,000-ton second-class light cruisers then entering service, the Hawkins-class cruisers each carried seven 190 mm (7.5-inch) guns and had a displacement just under 10,000 tons.
The difference between these light cruisers and ones that would follow with the heavy cruiser were almost as pronounced as that between the armoured cruiser and the battlecruiser. One reason for this difference was the intended mission of these light/heavy cruisers which were not intended to serve as a junior battleship, as the armoured cruiser had been, and were not built or designed to serve in that capacity. Armored cruisers were often pressed into the main line of battle against battlecruisers and dreadnought battleships (Battle of the Falkland Islands, Battle of Dogger Bank (1915), Battle of Jutland). By contrast, heavy cruisers and light cruisers were not expected to be deployed as such, although there had been some notable engagements (Battle of the Denmark Strait, Battle of Cape Matapan, Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, Battle of Surigao Strait). The heavy cruiser's main armament of 203 mm (8-inch) guns was smaller than the typical guns of the last armoured cruisers so their intended targets were other cruisers and smaller vessels. Further reasons for the difference were the advances in technology and naval design, both of which the heavy cruiser was able to take advantage. Heavy cruisers, like all contemporary ships, were typically powered by oil-fired steam turbine engines and were capable of far faster speeds than armoured cruisers had ever been (propelled by coal-fired reciprocating steam engines of their era). Nonetheless, heavy cruisers often had a larger number of main guns (some armoured cruisers had a mixed instead of uniform complement of main guns), discarded the mounting of main guns in in favour of centre-line Superfire turrets (saving tonnage and enabling the ship to fire all guns on one broadside), and benefited from the introduction of fire control in the 1920s and 1930s, meaning that the heavy cruiser was considerably more powerful.
Despite these intentions and set limitations, a number of new, powerful cruiser classes emerged from these nations, which sparked off something of a cruiser arms-race. The Japanese navy had a doctrine of building more powerful ships in every class than its likely opponents, which led to the development of several very impressive heavy cruiser classes. British and American building was more influenced by the desire to be able to match the Japanese ships while keeping enough cruisers for their other global responsibilities. With battleships heavily regulated by the Washington Treaty, and aircraft carriers not yet mature, the cruiser question became the focus of naval affairs. The British, with a strained economy and global commitments, favoured unlimited cruiser tonnage but strict limits on the individual ships. The Americans favoured the opposite: strictly limited numbers of powerful cruisers. Disagreements between the British and Americans wrecked the 1927 conference on naval affairs.
Even during the 1920s, the 10,000-ton limit was not always strictly observed, although British, French and American designers generally worked to the limit with precision. The British built 13 of the with four twin 8-inch gun turrets but with very minimal armour. The ships had fine sea-keeping qualities and a long range, but were virtually unprotected, and were easily damaged in combat. The Japanese , however, grew during its construction as the naval general staff prevailed on the designers to increase the weapons load. As well as a breach of the Treaty, this was a poor decision from the design point of view and the ships had to be reconstructed in the 1930s to reduce weight. The German was classified as armoured coast defence ships under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. They superficially resembled contemporary battleships due to their massive main gun turrets and unusually high conning tower/bridge. However, they were in effect a heavy cruiser being up gunned to 11-inch batteries at the cost of slower speed; their displacement was declared at 10,000 tons but was in practice considerably greater. The Italian Navy first built two
The s were the US Navy's first "treaty cruisers" designed in line with Washington Naval Treaty restrictions. Their main battery consisted of ten guns, in two twin turrets on the main deck, and two triple turrets two decks above, making it one of the two US Navy ship classes (besides the
The Treaty satisfied Britain and America. However, it deeply offended Japan, as this severely limited the numbers of heavy cruisers that the Imperial Japanese Navy could have, as they considered heavy cruisers as key warships in a line of battle with their 8-inch guns and heavy torpedo armament. The IJN placed less priority on purpose-built light cruisers, most of their existing types dating back to the 1920s (the five World War I-era light cruisers that the IJN commissioned were less well-armed than light cruisers of the US and Royal Navies), which were largely relegated to leading destroyer squadrons. The solution the Japanese adopted was to build the , which was declared as a 10,000 ton light cruiser with fifteen 6.1-inch guns. In practice, they displaced over 12,000 tons, had what was effectively a heavy cruiser hull design, and it was always intended to replace her turrets to give a final armament of ten 203 mm guns, making something of a nonsense of the light and heavy cruiser classifications. The waters were muddied further when the US Navy ceased laying down keels for new heavy cruisers in 1934 and used their new hull design for the Brooklyn class light cruiser. This type followed in the steps of Mogami by taking what was effectively a heavy cruiser hull and fitting light cruiser guns to it, and while the US Navy never fitted 8-inch guns to their "light" cruisers, the hull design was used as the basis for future heavy cruiser designs.
The German navy also paid lip-service to the treaty limitations, with the displacing 16,170 tons.
In the mid-1930s, Britain, France and Italy ceased building heavy cruisers. It was felt that, in a likely cruiser engagement, a larger number of 155 mm (6-inch) guns would be preferable to a smaller number of 203 mm (8-inch). While the 8-inch gun would inflict more damage when it hit, more 6-inch guns could be carried, likely resulting in more shells on target, and a greater chance of scoring the first hit. This led to the construction of cruisers up to the 10,000-tons limit, with twelve to fifteen 155 mm guns.
The 1936 London Naval Treaty, principally negotiated between Britain and the United States but never ratified, would have abolished the heavy cruiser entirely by restricting new construction to 8,000 tons and 155 mm (6.1-inch) guns. This suited Britain's needs very well, but was largely a dead letter. The U.S. continued to build heavy cruisers, culminating in the and .
Heavy cruiser order of battle between Japan and the United States and its allies:
Japan was only allowed 12 heavy cruisers by treaty, but had intentionally built the Mogamis with the option to have their main battery changed. The two Tones were also originally planned as light cruisers, but launched after the treaty system broke down with 8-inch guns. At the start of hostilities there was thus a parity between the United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy with respect to heavy cruisers.
The Germans built their heavy cruisers of 14,000 tons, although the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was supposed to limit their displacement to the 10,000 tons specified by the Washington Naval Treaty.
The US built the of heavy cruisers during the war. While earlier heavy cruisers were noted for their powerful torpedo armament (especially Japanese heavy cruisers), later ships built by the USN concentrated mainly on anti-aircraft armament, as their main role was escorting aircraft carriers and troop transports instead of engaging in surface actions. Most Japanese heavy cruisers were sunk by aircraft or submarines, rather than in surface engagements. Junyokan! Stories and Battle Histories of the IJN's Cruiser Force
The US built the last heavy cruisers, which were finished shortly after the war. The consisted of seventeen ships, including three of the slightly different . The were the last heavy cruisers built: though based on the Baltimores, they were considerably heavier and longer due to their new rapid-firing 203 mm (8-inch) guns. Additionally, two were built on a Baltimore-derived hull, the .
The largest heavy cruisers were the large cruisers, which were designed as "cruiser killers". They resembled contemporary battlecruisers or battleships in general appearance, as well as having main armament and displacement equal or greater than that of of the First World War. However, the Alaskas were actually upscaled heavy cruisers, as their machinery layout and the possession of a single rudder was based on cruisers rather than that of battleships or battlecruisers. Furthermore the Alaskas lacked the sophisticated underwater protection system featured in battleships and battlecruisers, making them vulnerable to shells and torpedoes that hit under the waterline. The Alaskas also had proportionately less weight in armour at 28.4% of displacement, in contrast to the British battlecruiser of 30%, the German and the U.S. Navy's s of 40%.Friedman, Battleship Design and Development, 166–173 Effectively, the Alaskas were ill-protected to stand up against the guns of true battleships and battlecruisers, and as carrier escorts they were much more expensive than the Baltimores while having only slightly better anti-aircraft capabilities. Given low priority by the USN, only two members of the Alaskas were completed and they saw little service as World War II ended not long after their commissioning.
Heavy cruisers fell out of use after the Second World War, with the Royal Navy decommissioning its last three (, , and ) by the early 1950s. Some existing US heavy cruisers lasted well through the 1970s, with the last all-gun ship decommissioning in 1975. , and , which had been converted to guided missile cruisers (US hull symbol CG), were laid up between 1975 and 1980.
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